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SUSTAINABLE BIOPROSPECTING: USING PRIVATE 
CONTRACTS AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES TO CONSERVE RAW 
MEDICINAL MATERIALS 
Christopher J. Hunter* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, a group of biologists were slogging through swampland in 
Malaysia seeking plants that they hoped would yield medicinally use-
ful chemical compounds upon examination in a laboratory.! One of the 
plant samples this group extracted was a one-kilogram collection of 
twigs, bark, and fruit from a Malaysian gum tree.2 Four years later, 
these biologists isolated from the twigs a compound that blocked the 
spread of the HIV-1 virus in an experiment with a human cell.3 Upon 
making this discovery, collectors returned immediately to the Malay-
sian swamp and to where they thought the source tree was located.4 
The tree was gone, however, felled shortly after the original material 
had been collected.5 Destruction of that Malaysian gum tree also de-
stroyed a genuinely promising discovery in the search for a cure for 
AIDS.6 
* Editor in Chief, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1997-1998. 
1 See Erin B. Newman, Note, Earth's Vanishing Medicine Cabinet: Rain Forest Destruction 
and Its Impact on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 20 AM. J. LAW & MED. 479, 482 (1994). 
2 See id. 
a See id. 
4 See id. 
6 See id. 
6 See Newman, supra note 1, at 482 (citing Usha Lee McFarling, Nature's Vanishing Phar-
macy, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1994, at 25). Scientists made another similarly promising discov-
ery with respect to AIDS vaccines-a compound from a vine native to the Cameroon rain forest. 
129 
130 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:129 
In the 1950s, scientists from the pharmaceutical manufacturer Eli 
Lilly & Co. discovered the rosy periwinkle, a plant from which they 
were able to derive compounds leading to the development of anti-
cancer agents vincristine and vinblastine.7 Vincristine is used to battle 
childhood leukemia, achieving a ninety percent remission rate, while 
vinblastine is deployed against Hodgkin's Disease with an eighty 
percent remission rate.S Eli Lilly & Co., which developed vincristine 
and vinblastine, relied initially on several source countries for its rosy 
periwinkle supply.9 High demand for a high quality plant ultimately 
led Eli Lilly to Madagascar, where the French cultivated rosy peri-
winkle plantations.10 With a steady supply of high quality plants, Eli 
Lilly consistently earned over $100 million annually from vincristine 
and vinblastine.l1 The Madagascar plantations proved to be fertile 
field for the rosy periwinkle, not to mention for Eli Lilly's annual net 
revenue. As one of Eli Lilly's researchers tells it, however, the peo-
ple of Madagascar living around the plantations became '''restless, 
threw the French out, and took over the supply."'12 Not only did this 
disrupt supply deliveries, it also detracted from supply quality.13 Con-
sequently, Eli Lilly established its own plantations, in Texas, with 
rosy periwinkles imported from Madagascar.14 Today, Eli Lilly's an-
nual sales from vincristine and vinblastine exceed $180 million.15 
Madagascar's share of the revenue from those sales is, as it always 
has been, zero.16 
See id. Researchers at the National Cancer Institute say that this compound also "inhibits the 
production of HIV in vitro." Id. 
7 See id. 
8 See id. 
9 See Sarah A. Laird, Contracts for Biodiversity Prospecting, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING 
99, 118 (1993). The original source country was India; India was followed by the Philippines and 
then by Australia. See id. 
10 See id. 
II See Walter V. Reid, et al., A New Lease on Life, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING 1, 15 (1993) 
[hereinafter Reid, New Lease]. 
12 Laird, supra note 9, at 118 (referencing a personal communication with Gordon Svoboda, 
who was involved in prospecting for the rosy periwinkle). 
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
16 See Newman, supra note 1, at 482. 
16 See Steven M. Rubin & Stanwood C. Fish, Biodiversity Prospecting: Using Innovative 
Contractual Provisions to Foster Ethnobotanical Knowledge, Technology, and Conservation, 5 
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 23, 27 (1994). 
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Searching the world's wildlands, as the team of biologists did for 
the Malaysian gum tree or as Eli Lilly's scientists did for the rosy 
periwinkle, is known as biodiversity prospecting or bioprospecting.17 
Bioprospectors-ranging from a village shaman in a developing coun-
try to a professionally-trained botanist from a multinational pharma-
ceutical company headquartered in a developed country-search the 
Earth's sanctuaries of biodiversity for flora and fauna that may offer 
the salve for a wound or the cure for a disease.18 Shamans, botanists, 
and others have discovered sources for many such salves and cures 
already, but many more discoveries await. The task for our time is to 
ensure that species survive so that discovery remains a possibility. 
This Comment addresses the legal framework within which bio-
prospecting is and should be conducted. Section II briefly defines 
biodiversity.19 Section III explains biodiversity prospecting in greater 
detail.20 Section IV introduces the policy of sustainable development 
as it relates to biodiversity, and focuses on the significance of conser-
vation incentives to that policy.21 Section V reveals the prominence of 
the policies of sustainable development of biodiversity and of conser-
vation incentives in the United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity.22 Section VI focuses specifically on the Costa Rican experi-
ence with sustainable development of its biodiversity resources, and 
the significance to that experience of a scientific research institute 
known as INBio.23 Section VII briefly describes a landmark contrac-
tual agreement between INBio and pharmaceutical giant Merck & 
Co., and discusses characteristics of bioprospecting contracts in gen-
eral.24 Section VIII integrates these experiences by proposing con-
tractual relationships between a national biodiversity institute mod-
eled on Costa Rica's INBio and parties (such as pharmaceutical 
companies) seeking access to a country's biodiversity resources as an 
appropriate method of conserving the world's raw medicinal materi-
als.25 
17 See, e.g., Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 1. 
18 See id. at 7. 
19 See infra notes 26-57 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 58-103 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 104--39 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 140-95 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 196-263 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 264-331 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 332-86 and accompanying text. 
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II. BIODIVERSITY'S VARIETY 
Gila monster venom,26 bark from a scraggly "junk tree,"27 and a 
plant whose popular name is the "stinking tree"28 may not immedi-
ately conjure up images of nature's lushness and richness. Yet, each 
of the above is a part of what broadly is termed ''biodiversity,'' and 
each is a potential ''biodiversity resource" of the country in which it is 
found. In the venom of the Gila monster lizard, Amylin Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., discovered a compound, exendin, which the company hopes 
to use to develop a drug for treating diabetes.29 From the bark and 
the needles of the Pacific yew tree, found in old-growth forests of the 
Pacific Northwest of the United States, the National Cancer Institute 
(NC!) derived the potent anticancer compound, taxol, a powerful 
chemotherapy used against ovarian, breast, and other cancers.30 Fi-
nally, to the people of India and China, the plant is known as the 
"stinking tree."3l To Smith Kline Beecham, however, the stinking tree 
is the source of campotothecin, an analog of which scientists have 
developed into the drug topotecan, another promising treatment a-
gainst ovarian cancer.32 The plants and animals from which these 
chemical compounds have been derived are known as ''biodiversity,'' 
and increasingly are becoming known also as valuable natural re-
sources. 
Specific examples help conceptualize the notion of biodiversity, but 
a general definition demonstrates just how much of life on Earth is 
captured by the term biodiversity. The United Nations Convention 
on Biological Diversity defines "biodiversity" as follows: "[T]he vari-
ability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
26 See Amylin Pharmaceuticals Acquires Rights To Potential Diabetes Drug Derived From 
Gila Monster Venom, Press Release, Oct. 7, 1996, New York (Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) 
[hereinafter Amylin Press Release]. 
27 See Douglas O. Heiken, The Pacific Yew and Taxol: Federal Management of an Emerging 
Resource, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 175,176 (1992). 
28 See Pharmaceutical Companies Go 'Chemical Prospecting' for New Medicines, PHARMA-
CEUTICAL Bus. NEWS, Aug. 21, 1992 (page unavail.). 
29 See AmyJin Press Release, supra note 26. 
30 See Pharmaceutical Companies Go 'Chemical Prospecting' for New Medicines, supra note 
28. For a detailed discussion of the story of the Pacific yew tree and federal management of it, 
see Heiken, supra note 27, at 175-77. 
31 See Pharmaceutical Companies Go 'Chemical Prospecting' For New Medicines, supra note 
28. 
32 See id. 
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complexes of which they are part."33 These "ecological complexes" 
include "diversity within species, between species and of ecosys-
tems,'134 and correlate to three hierarchical categories of living sys-
tems.36 The first is genetic diversity, defined as the variation of genes 
within a species.36 The second is species diversity, defined as the 
variety of species-"plants and animals, including fungi and microor-
ganisms"37-within a region.S8 The third is ecosystem diversity, de-
fined as the variety of ecosystems within a region.39 Thus, genes of 
species, species themselves, habitats in which species live, and eco-
systems comprised of individual habitats all constitute "biodiversity," 
just as each alone constitutes biodiversity.40 In Global Biodiversity 
Assessment: Summary for Policy-Makers, The United Nations En-
vironment Programme (UNEP) summarized the definition of biodi-
versity as the "variety of the world's organisms, including their ge-
netic makeup and the communities they form."41 "In short, 
biodiversity is life."42 
Biodiversity is also, however, a rich natural resource.43 The Conven-
tion on Biodiversity expressed this notion of biodiversity as a re-
source in its definition of "biological resources" as including "genetic 
resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic 
component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for 
humanity."44 Gila monster venom, tree bark and plant leaves all con-
tain within their genetic structure chemical compounds "with actual 
or potential ... value for humanity."46 Genetic manipulation of these 
and other chemical compounds from plants, fungi, bacteria, and ma-
33 Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, 
June 5, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818, 823 (1992) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention]. 
34 Id. 
36 See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW VOL. 1 368 
(1995); see also Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regi'YM Con-
cerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INTL ENVTL. L. & POL'y 111, 112 (1996). 
36 See SANDS, supra note 35, at 368. 
37 See Bosselmann, supra note 35, at 112. 
33 See SANDS, supra note 35, at 368. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 R.T. WATSON, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY As-
SESSMENT: SUMMARY FOR POLICy-MAKERS 8 (1995) [hereinafter GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY As-
SESSMENT]. 
42 BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW xix (William J. Snape III ed., 1996). 
43 See generally E.O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 281 (1992). 
44 Biodiversity Convention, 8UpTa note 33, at 823. 
45 See id. (defining biological resources). 
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rine invertebrates has turned some countries' biodiversity into their 
most valuable raw material, especially as an increasing number of 
medicines and vaccines are developed from naturally occurring chemi-
cal compounds.46 Biodiversity resources thus have become valued 
directly for their consumptive use and their productive use as raw 
medicinal materials.47 Biodiversity resources also have indirect values 
such as option value, existence value, and non-consumptive value.48 
Examples of indirect values include soil erosion prevention, water 
purification, biodegradation of pollutants and wastes, as well as cul-
tural or spiritual appreciation of biodiversity.49 Although the utility of 
these indirect values is significant, biodiversity will be appreciated as 
valuable in and of itself only by recognizing the utility that comes 
directly from ecosystems and the species dwelling within them.5O As 
appreciation for biodiversity and for its direct utility is expanding, 
however, the Earth's warehouse of biodiversity resources is shrink-
ing. 
The Earth is in the midst of what has been called a "biodiversity 
crisis."61 Biodiversity conservationists struggle against agriculture 
and timber interests' agendas of destruction, and, too often, lose the 
struggle.62 Scientists have estimated that, without greater global con-
servation efforts, twenty-five percent of the world's species will be-
come extinct within the next fifty years, while the habitats in which 
they live will suffer a similar rate of extinction through deforestation, 
desertification, and destruction ofwetlands.63 Some estimates suggest 
that approximately 150 species become extinct each day,64 while 
twenty-seven million acres of tropical forests-which are home to a 
majority of the world's biodiversity-are destroyed each year.56 The 
46 See, e.g., John Vidal, The Gene Rush, ToRONTO STAR, July 10, 1993, at D6. 
47 See JEFFREY A. McNEELY, ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: DEVELOPING AND 
USING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO CONSERVE BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 14-19 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter McNEELY, ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY]. 
48 See id. at 15, 19-24. 
49 See GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY ASSESSMENT, BUpra note 41, at 12; McNEELY, ECONOMICS AND 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 47, at 21. 
60 See McNEELY, ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 47, at 1. 
61 Jeffrey A. McNeely, The Biodiversity Crisis: Challenges for Research and Management, 
in CONSERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 15, 16 (O.T. Sandlund, 
et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter McNeely, Biodiversity Cri8is]. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 See, e.g., Tracy Dobson, Loss of Biodiversity: An International Environmental Policy 
Perspective, 17 N.C. J. INTL L. & CoM. REG. 277, 279 (1992). 
66 See Bosselmann, 8Upra note 35, at 113. 
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refrain is not new. Rainforest destruction and its consequences have 
been a popular socio-political issue for years. Confronting biodiversity 
loss by building the reality of self-interested human nature into a 
framework for conservation through use of tropical rainforests and 
other biodiversity-rich areas may be gaining cachet. 
Presently, the total number of species on Earth is estimated to be 
between thirteen and fourteen million, while only 1.75 million species 
have been described scientifically.58 The latter figure is misleading, 
however, because no official list of described species exists; even if 
such a list did exist, the area in which a species was found initially 
and described may have changed so dramatically as to make it impos-
sible to relocate the species there.67 The foregoing combination of 
circumstances surrounding biodiversity continues to be alarming: The 
rate of species extinction, general ignorance as to the existence and 
constitution of a vast majority of the world's species, and fluctuating 
knowledge of the majority of species with which we are scientifically 
familiar produces a dangerous situation where we do not know what 
we are losing. (Re-)discovering the medicinal utility of the Earth's 
biodiversity should awaken a broader cross-section of the world's 
peoples to the need to conserve biodiversity in order to maintain 
sustainability of the Earth's vanishing raw medicinal materials. 
III. BIOPROSPECTING: (RE-)DISCOVERING THE MEDICINAL 
POWER OF NATURE 
A "new breed" of species has appeared and proliferated over the 
last decade, however, especially in tropical forests-the ''biodiversity 
prospector."68 This species has many varieties, ranging from a single 
villager dwelling within biodiverse areas to a professionally-trained 
team of botanists foraging through biodiverse areas.69 Most varieties 
of biodiversity prospector, though, have this in common: They search 
for naturally occurring palliatives or curatives in the bark, leaves, 
fruits, stalks, and roots of plants, in soil-dwelling microbes, in the 
genetic constitution of both vertebrate and invertebrate species, and 
in all other varieties of life.60 In short, bioprospecting is the "search 
56 See GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 41, at 8. 
67 See id. at 16. 
68 Jonathan Lash, Foreword, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING V (1993). 
69 See, e.g., Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 3-4. 
60 See generally Lash, supra note 58; Reid, New Lease, supra note 11. 
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for bioactive compounds in natural sources such as plants, fungi, 
insects, microbes, and marine organisms."61 
Most bioprospectors focus primarily on searching for species which 
may possess some medicinal value; the great hope always is that upon 
opening "nature's medicine cabinet,"62 scientists will be able to remove 
the "top" of a plant and discover inside a chemical compound that 
ultimately will yield, for example, a potent anticancer agent or a cure 
for Alzheimer's Disease.63 This is the type of bioprospecting discussed 
in this Comment, the "search for wild species of flora and fauna whose 
genes can yield new medicines."64 The public health and private finan-
cial interests in natural product drug development are significant.65 
The active ingredients in twenty-five percent of all prescription drugs 
sold in the United States are extracted or derived from plants.66 In 
1990, sales from these plant-based drugs were estimated to be $15.5 
billion.67 
Remedies derived from plants have been for many centuries the 
primary form of medical care for most of the world's people.68 At one 
time, plants were also the primary source of material for pharmaceu-
tical companies engaged in drug development.69 An example of these 
early discoveries is digitalis, derived from the foxglove, and used to 
treat congestive heart failure.70 Beginning in the 1950s, however, 
natural product drug development fell into disfavor for several rea-
sons.71 First, the pharmaceutical industry became enamored of its own 
ability to manufacture synthetic drugs.72 Technological advances al-
lowed biochemists to create drugs in the laboratory using computer 
61 Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Note, Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling the Man-
date of the Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J. 'lRANSNAT'L L. 703, 706 (1995). 
62 Newman, supra note 1, at 479. 
63 See id. Bioprospectors also might seek out species from which, for example, new insecticides 
can be developed for agricultural use. See generally SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND 
CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES (Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr., ed., 1988). 
64 Margot Cohen, Forest Fire: The Biodiversity Debate Heats Up in Asia, FARE. ECON. REV., 
Jan. 11, 1996, at 66. 
65 See Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 7. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See William K. Stevens, Scientists and Shamans Seek Cures in Plants, MIAMI HERALD, 
Feb. 2, 1992, at 7C. Even today, researchers estimate that three-fourths of the world's popula-
tion still relies on such traditional herbal medicines. See id. 
69 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER JOYCE, EARTHLY GoODS: MEDICINE-HUNTING IN THE RAINFOR-
EST 8 (1994). 
70 See id. at 18-19. 
71 See, e.g., Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 61, at 706. 
72 See id. 
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modeling.73 While technological advances in synthetic drug manufac-
turing in part shifted attention away from natural products research, 
technological stagnation in natural products research and develop-
ment also shifted the focus of attention. Collection methods were 
inefficient, and, once samples of natural products were collected, 
screening them for chemical activity was slow and expensive.74 Pros-
pecting for plants with bioactive compounds was in some ways a 
random, haphazard process earlier in this century than it was a struc-
tured, focused process.75 Especially in the last decade, however, this 
bias against natural product drug development has been changing 
dramatically, as scientists have realized that natural products often 
offer the best starting points for drug discovery, and as screening 
technology has improved.76 
Although random screening methods still are used, companies such 
as Merck today can screen thousands of samples at a much quicker 
rate and for a much cheaper cost.77 An explanation of the modern 
screening process follows. Extracting chemicals from the natural 
product is the first step.78 That extract then is divided into chemically 
distinct samples, and screened through numerous bioassays to look 
for chemical activity against a specific disease.79 If a sample shows 
activity, screening becomes more precise, as the sample is divided 
further and screened again to identify the active chemical, and to 
determine whether it is already in use or whether it was the subject 
of an earlier study which resulted in its rejection.so The results of this 
second round of screening determine whether a company proceeds 
with further evaluation and, eventually, clinical trials.8! Because of ad-
vanced screening technology and renewed appreciation for the com-
plex chemical composition of plants and other organisms, natural 
product pharmaceutical research seems finally to have proven its 
73 See Pharmaceutical Companies Go 'Chemical Prospecting' for New Medicines, supra note 
28. 
74 See Walter V. Reid, Screening for New Drugs, ENV'T., July 1, 1995 at 12 (containing related 
article on screening for new drugs) [hereinafter Reid, Screening]. 
76 See id. 
76 See Pharmaceutical Companies Go 'Chemical Prospecting'for New Medicines, supra note 
28. 
77 See id. 
78 See Reid, Screening, supra note 74. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
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worth. As a Glaxo spokesman poignantly put it, "It's hard to find a 
chemist that can compete with nature."82 
Bioprospecting is subject, however, to excesses and abuses. Enthu-
siasm over discovering a promising plant may propel scientists and 
their collectors to extract species or samples of species at a rate and 
volume that threaten the source species' very existence.83 For exam-
ple, the "entire adult population of Maytenu8 buchananni-source of 
the anticancer compound maytansine"-is gone, harvested to extinc-
tion by a U.S. National Cancer Institute-sponsored prospecting team 
that collected 27,215 kilograms of the plant in Kenya for testing in 
NCl's drug development program.84 
The anticipated public health benefits from a plant that holds po-
tential anticancer agents within its chemical composition not surpris-
ingly may excite scientists to such a pitch that they fail to consider 
conserving the resource, even though conservation would be in eve-
ryone's-especially their own-best interests. If a major pharmaceu-
tical company had been behind the prospecting team in Kenya, one 
might suspect excitement over such a find to be stimulated by antici-
pated increase in corporate wealth, rather than by anticipated im-
provement to public health.86 The simple point is that impulse, 
whether altruistic or commercial, may blind individuals, institutions, 
and corporations to the necessity of maintaining long-term sustain-
ability of biodiversity resources. 
Bioprospecting also is susceptible to abuse through exploitation of 
citizens of the country in which the prospecting is conducted86 as well 
as of the source country itself.87 Both types of exploitation generally 
82 Pharmaceutical Companies Go 'Clwmical Prospecting' for New Medicines, supra note 28. 
83 See, e.g., Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 3. 
84 Id. at 3-4. 
85 See id. at 3 (noting that "commercial interest in biodiversity will not necessarily fuel 
increased investment in resource conservation"). 
86 See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific 
and Technical Krwwledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 919, 920 
(1996). 
87 See, e.g., TIw Costs of'Bio-Piracy' 7b tlw Third World, MARKETLE'ITER, Dec. 19, 1994 (page 
unavail.) [hereinafter Costs of Biopiracy]. A study commissioned by the United Nations and 
conducted by the Rural Advancement Foundation International reported that pharmaceutical 
companies receive over thirty billion dollars annually from drugs derived from plants discovered 
in developing nations, but that those countries receive minimal, if any, payment for the raw 
materials. See id.; see also Cohen, supra note 64 (noting that even where pharmaceutical 
companies negotiate with the government of a country for access to its country's biodiversity 
resources, environmentalists urge caution "lest the prospectors make off with all of the treas-
ure"). 
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are referred to as ''biopiracy.''88 Biopiracy that victimizes individuals 
has been defined as the exploitation of "indigenous peoples to locate 
and understand the uses of medicinal plants"-Le., the exploitation of 
their "ethnopharmacological" knowledge89-and then to develop and 
market drugs derived from those plants, while returning little or no 
compensation from sales of the drug to the indigenous peoples.90 
Biopiracy of indigenous peoples has not been limited only to their 
knowledge of local flora and fauna, however. For example, in 1983, 
field scientists stumbled upon the Hagahai tribe, a Melanesian tribe 
of approximately 300 members, in a remote jungle in the interior of 
Papua New Guinea.91 In May, 1989, during the course of a decade of 
research on this tribe, U.S. scientists isolated a rare virus strain in 
some members, extracted blood samples from twenty-four of them for 
further study, and staked a patent claim to the blood.92 Research 
showed that a cell line from Hagahai members' blood ultimately might 
prove valuable in "diagnosing adult leukemia and chronic degenera-
tive neurologic disease."93 As this and other examples94 suggest, re-
88 See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 86, at 920; Costs of Biopiracy, supra note 87. 
89 See, e.g., Curtis M. Horton, Protecting Biodiversity and Cultural Diversity Under Intellec-
tual Property Law: 1bward a New International System, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1,4,6-8 
(1995). Because indigenous peoples have used native plants for medicinal purposes for genera-
tions, accessing the accumulated knowledge within these local communities has allowed pros-
pecting pharmaceutical companies to increase greatly the percentage of "hits" the companies 
get when screening plant extracts for potential medicinal activity. Id. Horton illustrates the 
value of ethnopharmacological knowledge to pharmaceutical companies with the following: 
"Assuming a six-fold increase in screening efficiency, and using other industry assumptions, the 
probability of developing at least one marketable pharmaceutical from 1,000 samples grows from 
twenty-two percent to seventy-eight percent." Id. at 5. One United States company has bet all 
of its drug exploration activity on ethnopharmacological knowledge. See, e.g., Reid, New Lease, 
supra note 11, at 7. Founded in 1989, Shaman Pharmaceuticals, Inc., based in San Carlos, 
California, prioritizes its drug exploration and sample screening on existing traditional uses of 
plants. See Pharmaceutical Companies Go 'Chemical Prospecting' for New Medicines, supra 
note 28. Several of Shaman Pharmaceutical's drugs derived in this way have made it to clinical 
trials, but none have made it on the market yet. See id. 
90 See Andrew Kimbrell, Biotechnology: 'Biodemocracy' Needed 7b Replace 'Biopiracy, ' Inter 
Press Serv., Aug. 8, 1996 (page unavail.). 
91 See David Robie, Biotechnology-South Pacific: Tribe Caught in Blood Tug-of-War, Inter 
Press Serv., Oct. 25, 1995 (page unavail.). 
92 See id.; Kimbrell, supra note 90. 
93 Kimbrell, supra note 90. 
94 See, e.g., Mahesh Uniyal, Trade: Biopirates Stake Claim 7b Southern Knowledge, Inter 
Press Serv., Aug. 29, 1996 (page unavail.). Thmeric powder has been used in India for genera-
tions as an ingredient in cooking, but also as an antiseptic and "wound-healer." See id. A 
university medical center from the United States, however, was awarded a patent on the 
medicinal properties of tumeric powder. See id. See also Roht-Arriaza, supra note 86, at 921-26 
(discussing several other examples). 
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searchers historically have had relatively open access to ethnophar-
macological knowledge and to raw medicinal materials themselves, 
even if those materials have been fellow human beings. 
Countries also may be victimized by biopiracy.96 Developing coun-
tries from the Southern Hemisphere typically are the victims of this 
type of biopiracy.96 These countries, whose landscapes are lush with 
biodiverse tropical forests, are home to a majority of the world's 
species, but they do not have the capability always to assert and 
protect their national sovereignty over these biodiversity resources.97 
A persistent complaint from many of these countries is that developed 
nations from the Northern Hemisphere either themselves engage 
in unauthorized resource extraction, or are complicit in their pharma-
ceutical and biotechnology companies'· unauthorized resource extrac-
tion.98 A recent confrontation involving two developed countries, the 
United States and Australia, illustrates this type ofbiopiracy. In 1980, 
prospectors from the U.S. Department of Agriculture collected sam-
ples of Smokebush, an Australian plant found in the deserts of West-
ern Australia, and brought it to NCI laboratories in the United 
States.99 Using those samples, scientists at NCI were able to isolate 
a drug called conocurvone which "stops the replication of the HIV 
virus in test tubes."HlO NCI then applied for a patent.101 Aware of this 
discovery and, more importantly, aware of the possibility of being 
excluded from any profits made from the sale of conocurvone, the 
Western Australia Department of Conservation and Land Manage-
ment investigated Smokebush collecting activities, and actually 
"caught an NCI collector allegedly smuggling Smokebush" out of 
Australia in 1992.102 NCI now has an agreement with the Australians 
95 See Costs of Bio-Piracy, supra note 87. 
96 See id. 
97 See generally Thomas T. Ankersen, The MesoAmerican Biological Corridor: The Legal 
Framework for an Integrated, Regional System of Protected Areas, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 
499, 537--47 (1994) (proposing regional coordination of biodiversity management in Central 
America). 
98 See id. 
99 See Pratap Chatterjee, Environment: Medicine Hunters Scour Rainforests, Deserts, Inter 
Press Serv., July 10, 1995 (page unavail.). 
100 Id. 
101Id. 
102 Id. This type of thievery is not new. In 1876, Henry Wickham smuggled 70,000 rubber seeds 
out of Brazil and distributed them to British colonies in Asia. See Bosselmann, supra note 35, 
at 121. By 1919, the British colony of Singapore was the world's leading producer of rubber, 
supplanting Brazil which had produced nearly all of the world's rubber just two decades prior. 
See id. Despite having one of its most prized natural resources pirated without permission, 
Brazil had no way to redress its grievance. See id. 
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guaranteeing a share of profits from sales of this and other drugs for 
any local Australian community with which NCI works.1°O 
IV. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF BIODIVERSITY 
The leaves of the jaborandi tree, native to Brazil, contain pilocar-
pine, an alkaloid used to make eye-drops to treat glaucoma.104 A phar-
maceutical company had contracted with villagers living near stands 
of jaborandi trees in northeastern Brazil to provide the company with 
a steady supply of the leaves, which it then exported for processing.106 
When Brazilian authorities halted exportation of the raw material in 
part because of diminishing supply, the company began processing the 
leaves in BrazilYJ6 While demand for jaborandi leaves did not abate, 
supply of the trees did, forcing the company to try to plant and 
cultivate the tree out of fear that its supply of pilocarpine would be 
exhausted.107 The faveiro, a plant native to southern Brazil, faced a 
similar crisis. lOB A blood coagulant can be derived from the leaves of 
the plant, but uncontrolled extraction of the faveiro also has threat-
ened its surviva1.109 
These two examples illustrate the unique challenge inherent in bio-
prospecting for medicinally valuable plants. The availability of glau-
coma treatment and of blood coagulants is unarguably beneficial to 
the public health. When there is a finite supply of the natural product 
used in developing eye-drops or coagulants, however, maintaining 
availability of the commercial product necessitates taking a long-term 
perspective on viability of the natural product. That is, plants may 
replenish over time, but in order for that to happen, some must be 
left untouched. If a plant is to be harvested and used for drug devel-
opment without regard for its continued existence, the natural source 
of a medicine will disappear, as a once-viable species rapidly becomes 
extinct. Within the policy of sustainable development is a response to 
the challenge of maintaining medicinal availability and species viabil-
ity. 
108 See Chatterjee, supra note 99. 
104 See Mario Osava, Environment: Medicinal Plants Under Threat, Inter Press Serv., May 
29, 1996 (page unavail.). 
106 See id. 
106 See id. 
10'7 See id. 
106 See id. 
109 See Osava, BUpra note 104. 
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Sustainable development is a policy by which present needs are met 
and future needs are accounted for.uo More formally, it is a "pattern 
of social and structural economic transformations (Le., 'development') 
which optimizes the economic and other societal benefits available 
in the present, without jeopardizing the likely potential for similar 
benefits in the future."lll As applied in the context of biodiversity, sus-
tainable development requires ''husbanding'' biodiversity resources 
so that those resources may be used to "improve the human condi-
tion," yet endure indefinitely.u2 The policy, then, has two seemingly 
competing components-conservation and use. Emphasizing the "con-
servation" component means focusing on the Earth's "abundance and 
distribution of living organisms without regard for their significance 
to human health."u3 Emphasizing the "use" component means seeing 
the Earth as a "storehouse of resources made available to us for our 
exploitation and consumption."u4 
The commercialization of biodiversity, the "use" component, tends 
to be driven by self-interested profit incentives, and has the potential 
to subsume the "conservation" component, which tends to be driven 
by altruistic-albeit not entirely benign-incentives often having less 
force in the market.u6 Walter V. Reid of the World Resources Institute 
(WRI) cautions that three problems must be overcome if commerciali-
zation is to be prevented from subsuming conservation.U6 The first 
problem is that the commercial interest in biodiversity does not nec-
essarily "lead to investment in resource conservation."117 In fact, the 
commercial interest poses a potential example of the "free rider" 
phenomenon. Biodiversity can benefit many people simultaneously. us 
Similarly, one individual's conservation efforts can benefit many other 
biodiversity users.U9 Market incentives, however, dictate that each 
110 See, e.g., Arne Naess, Sustainability! The Integral Approach, in CONSERVATION OF BIO-
DIVERSITY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 303, 306 (O.T. Sandlund et aI. eds., 1992). 
111 See McNEELY, ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 47, at 198. 
112 WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, ET AL., GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY STRATEGY: GUIDELINES 
FOR ACTION TO SAVE, STUDY AND USE EARTH'S BIOTIC WEALTH SUSTAINABLY AND EQUITA-
BLY 20 (1992) [hereinafter GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY STRATEGY]. 
113 Walter V. Reid, Biodiversity and Health: Prescription for Progress, ENV'T. July 1, 1995 
(page unavail.) [hereinafter Reid, Biodiversity and Health]. 
114 James P. Karp, Essay, Sustainable Development: 7bward a New Vision, 13 VA. ENVTL. L. 
J. 239, 246 (1994). 
115 See Reid, Biodiversity and Health, supra note 113. 
116 See id. 
117 Id. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. 
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user maximize the utility of the resource by, for example, harvesting 
one more bed of medicinally valuable flowering plants, rather than 
abstaining from harvesting.120 That is, users of biodiversity resources 
will count on each other to be conservation-minded, when in fact each 
user is seeking to maximize its own utility from biodiversity through 
continued development. In this way, bioprospecting could quicken the 
destruction of biodiversity.121 
Solving the second problem requires devising a way to encourage 
conservation by source countries.l22 Even ifbioprospectors from tran-
snational corporations are judicious with respect to the scope of their 
collecting activity, the source country, typically a developing nation, 
often is forced to sell its biodiversity resources to the highest bidder, 
regardless of the use to which it will be put.l23 Developing nations 
generally do not have any economic incentive to conserve biodiversity, 
even though biodiversity is some nations' most valuable natural re-. 
source.l24 Ensuring that the source countries share in the benefits 
from their biodiversity resources co-opts the need of developing coun-
tries to profit from their biodiversity, while simultaneously encourag-
ing conservation.125 A third, related problem is the need to ensure that 
indigenous peoples living among biodiversity-the "custodians" of 
biodiversity resources126-also are motivated by conservation incen-
tives.127 To do this, indigenous peoples also must be able to share in 
the benefits of bioprospecting.128 
While sustainable development implies limits on current consump-
tion in order to fulfill a responsibility to present and future genera-
tions,129 this conservation component of the theory is problematic, be-
cause conservation seldom has a market value.130 A market value can 
be affixed to biodiversity resources generally, however. Biodiversity 
resources could be considered quasi-non-renewable resources.131 Re-
120 See Reid, Biodiversity and Health, supra note 113. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. 
128 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 See Reid, Biodiversity and Health, supra note 113. 
126 See, e.g., Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 2 (among those considered "custodians" are 
"forest dwellers and indigenous people who maintain or tolerate the resources involved"). 
127 See Reid, Biodiversity and Health, supra note 113. 
128 See id. 
129 See Karp, supra note 114, at 253. 
130 See, e.g., McNEELY, ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 47, at 9. 
131 See id. at 1-2 (describing non-renewable resources). 
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newable resources include "forests, animals and grasslands; the re-
newable resources are inexhaustible when managed appropriately."132 
Non-renewable resources include "oil, coal, gold, and iron," and have 
a finite supply.l33 Biodiversity resources could be considered quasi-
nonrenewable resources, because "they are renewable if conserved; 
and they are [destroyed] if not conserved."l34 
An effective policy of sustainable development requires, therefore, 
mechanisms of accountability for environmental and socioeconomic 
consequences of human activities, as well as for the problems dis-
cussed above.135 Because the sustainable development of biodiversity 
transcends the boundaries of individual countries, the burden of ac-
countability falls on many actors, on severallevels.136 Actors who have 
a role to play in accountability include the following: individuals living 
among biodiversity resources; companies engaged in bioprospecting; 
source countries, rich in biodiversity resources; countries that benefit, 
either directly or derivatively, from use of biodiversity resources; and 
international governmental organizations, which are important to the 
formulation of a coherent policy for sustainable development.137 
Constructing a legal framework in which accountability for sustain-
able development of biodiversity resources may take place is a col-
laborative task, therefore, that must be undertaken by both the in-
ternational community and individual countries.13B Sustainable 
development can be a unifying policy of conservation and use, satis-
fying the objectives of each of those two components. This notion of 
sustainable development, as one commentator noted, may sound like 
"idealistic pie in the sky."l39 Were it not for specific actions taken by 
both the international community and individual countries, such a 
criticism of the policy of sustainable development might have merit. 
132 See id. at 1. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 2, 195. 
136 See Ellen Hey, Increasing Accountability for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of 
Biodiversity: An Issue of'Pransnational Global Character, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 
1, 2, ~ (1995). 
136 See id. at 6; see also GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY STRATEGY, supra note 112, at 20. 
137 See Hey, supra note 135, at 6-7. 
138 See, e.g., GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY STRATEGY, supra note 112, at 20. 
139 Karp, supra note 114, at 254. 
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V. THE BIODIVERSITY CONVENTION: AN INTERNATIONAL 
EMBRACE OF MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES FOR CONSERVATION 
On December 29, 1993, an international legal instrument signed by 
more than 160 countries and ratified by approximately forty went into 
force with the desired effect of securing the blessings of biodiversity 
to the citizens of the signatory countries and their posterity.l40 That 
instrument, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 
(Convention, or, Biodiversity Convention), is an international agree-
ment designed to protect the world's biodiversity by harmonizing 
environmental and economic goals under the policy of sustainable 
development.141 Through new international legal obligations as well as 
through commitments to adopt national legislation, the Convention 
calls upon countries to recognize the inherent and economic values of 
biodiversity, and to take advantage of those values by taking affirma-
tive steps on the national and locallevel,142 In this way, the challenge 
of the Convention resides in the individual countries to find ways to 
implement the ideals expressed in the articles.l43 
Prior to adopting the Convention, however, the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which con-
vened June 3-14, 1994, in Rio de Janiero, Brazil,t44 had to overcome 
one of the most intractable problems common to international agree-
ments that are designed to be more than merely aspirational. 
UNCED had to reconcile respect for national sovereignty with the 
need for shared global responsibility.l46 Each individual country, even 
though it may be a member of the international community, cherishes 
its basic right of self-determination.146 This notion of self-determina-
tion historically has included "freedom of action with regard to the 
natural resources found within a nation's boundaries."147 As discussed 
140 See Catherin 'linker, A 'New Breed' o/Treaty: The United Nations Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 191 (1995). 
141 See, e.g., David R. Downes, Global 7rade, Local Economies, and the Biodiversity Conven-
tion, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW 202, 202-00 (William J. Snape III ed., 1996). 
142 See Tinker, supra note 140, at 192. 
143 See Downes, supra note 141, at 203. 
144 See Edith Brown Weiss, IntroducWry Note, 31 I.L.M. 814 (1992) (providing background for 
the Biodiversity Convention and other UNCED documents). 
145 See Susan H. Bragdon, National Sovereignty and Global Environmental Responsibility: 
Can the Tension Be Reconciled/or the Conservation 0/ Biological Diversity?, 33 HARV. INTL 
L.T. 381, 381-82 (1992). 
146 See id. at 382. 
147Id.; see generally Subrata Roy Chowdhury, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Re-
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earlier, biodiversity is recognized as a valuable natural resource, but 
it also is a resource that cannot be contained by political boundaries. 
A nation might be sovereign over biodiversity within its boundaries, 
but it also must take responsibility for conserving those resources 
because of the unique trans-boundary quality of biodiversity and of 
the global importance of biodiversity. 
Countries both rich and poor in biodiversity resources have iden-
tified (in platitudes if not in practice) conservation as being in their 
individual self-interest.148 Northern Hemisphere countries, generally 
poor in biodiversity resources but rich in technology capable of devel-
oping those resources, have an interest in conservation, because bio-
diversity resources offer the raw material for new medicines.149 South-
ern Hemisphere countries, generally rich in biodiversity resources 
but poor in biotechnology and capital to acquire biotechnology, have 
an increasing interest in conservation because of developed coun-
tries' demand for biodiversity resources, and because of the economic 
growth this demand can create.1OO The common cloth of interests frays, 
however, over the implications of the traditional understanding of na-
tional sovereignty as including freedom of action over natural re-
sources within a country's botders.151 Beneath the fraying of interests 
is the "reality that while [biodiversity] resources are predominantly 
located within the territories of the South, the profits derived from 
their use are almost exclusively reaped by the industrialized 
N orth."l52 This is especially troublesome to developing countries, 
where fulfilling basic immediate needs for survival takes precedence 
over fulfilling long-term sustainability needs which may be difficult 
even to perceive when existence is at a subsistence level.l53 Thus, 
when it comes to how best to allocate its natural resources, including 
its biodiversity, a developing country that receives no share of the 
profit from biodiversity conserved will manage its resources so that 
it does profit from biodiversity exploited. l54 Self-interest demands 
nothing less. 
sources, in PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
1-41 (Kamal Hassain and Subrata Roy Chowdhury eds., 1984). 
148 See Bragdon, supra note 145, at 388. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. 
161 See id. 
152 [d. 
163 See Bragdon, supra note 145, at 388. 
164 See id. at 389. 
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A. Encouraging Reponsibility for Conservation and for Use 
The Biodiversity Convention is a compromise between developing 
and developed countries, representing their collective best efforts to 
reconcile the tension between national sovereignty and global envi-
ronmental responsibility.l66 Article Three of the Biodiversity Conven-
tion is the provision that specifically articulates the guiding principle 
on the appropriate balance between national sovereignty and global 
responsibility.l66 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environ-
ment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of their national 
jurisdiction.157 
This principle recognizes national sovereignty over biodiversity re-
sources, but it also recognizes the reality that the "environment" does 
not stop at political boundaries.l66 Instead, Article Three appends to 
the right of national sovereignty a concomitant responsibility to en-
sure that activity taken pursuant to that right does not impinge upon 
the national sovereignty of any other country by, for example, harm-
ing another country's biodiversity resources.159 
The number of countries that ultimately signed the Convention 
suggests success at striking this compromise.l60 The objectives stated 
in the Convention incorporate this compromise as a foundation for the 
individual articles.161 The threefold objectives are "conservation of 
biological diversity, sustainable use of its components, and the fair and 
166 See, e.g., SANDS, supra note 35, at 49. 
166 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 824; see also Bosselmann, supra note 35, at 
135. 
167 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 824. 
166 See id.; see also Bosselmann, supra note 35, at 135; Tinker, supra note 140, at 195. 
159 See id. Article Three is a verbatim version of Principle 'IWenty-one of the Stockholm 
Conference of 1972 (which was the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment). See Bosselmann, supra note 35, at 134-35; 'linker, supra note 140, at 195. Principle 
'IWenty-one, called the "cornerstone" of international environmental law, established each coun-
try's basic individual right of national sovereignty, and placed an other-directed obligation on 
that country if it wants to exercise that right. See Sands, supra note 39, at 186. The Biodiversity 
Convention was constructed relying on this cornerstone. 
160 See Tinker, supra note 140, at 191-95. 
161 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 823. 
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equitable sharing of benefits."l62 To fulfill those objectives, the Con-
vention generally provides for the following: 
[N]ational monitoring of biological diversity, the development of 
national strategies, plans and programs for conserving biological 
diversity, national in situ and ex situ conservation measures, en-
vironmental impact assessments of projects for adverse effects on 
biological diversity, and national reports from parties on measures 
taken to implement the convention and the effectiveness of these 
measures. l63 
Specifically, the Convention contemplates several interrelated meth-
ods of action to accomplish its objectives. l64 First, the Convention 
itself is a new international legal instrument, with particular provi-
sions for international action, and it supports a second method of 
action, which is implementation by individual countries of new na-
tional laws and policies designed to conserve biodiversity resources 
and to use those resources sustainably.l65 Third, the Convention sets 
up new rules for the international transfer of genetic resources. l66 
Several of the provisions are of particular importance to bio-
prospecting. The preamble to the Biodiversity Convention, though it 
does not establish binding international legal obligations, neverthe-
less reflects the more forward-thinking aspirations of the signatory 
countries.167 The preamble recognizes the "intrinsic value of biological 
diversity," a first for this type of international legal instrument,168 It 
also recognizes the economic value of biodiversity, another interna-
tional first, thereby setting up the two rationales for conservation.169 
Article Fifteen addresses "rights and obligations regarding access to 
genetic [and biodiversity] resources and their subsequent use," and 
reaffirms national sovereignty over resources.170 Article Fifteen calls 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 817. 
164 See Downes, supra note 141, at 204. 
165 See id. 
166 See id. at 204--05. 
167 See LYLE GLOWKA, ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 9 
(IUCN Environmental Law Center, IUCN Biodiversity Programme, World Conservation Un-
ion Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 30, 1994) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE CONVEN-
TION]. 
168 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 822; see also GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION, supra 
note 167, at 9. 
169 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 822; see also Victor M. Marroquin-Merino, 
Wildlife Utilization: A New International Mechanism for the Protection of Biological Diversity, 
26 LAW & POL'y INTL Bus. 303, 324 (1995). 
170 GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION, supra note 167, at 76; see also Biodiversity Convention, supra 
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upon each country, however, to facilitate access to those resources for 
"environmentally sound uses."17l Specifically, paragraph seven of Ar-
ticle Fifteen requires each country to take "legislative, administrative 
or policy measures . . . with the aim of sharing . . . the results of 
research and development and the benefits arising from the commer-
cial and other utilization" of biodiversity resources.172 'Article Nine-
teen also requires each country to take similar measures to provide 
for the "effective participation in biotechnological research activities 
... especially [by] developing countries, which provide the genetic 
resources for such research."173 
Several articles address financing these measures.174 The first para-
graph of Article Twenty calls upon each individual country "to provide 
financial support and incentives for the national measures needed to 
implement the Convention.1I175 Paragraphs two through four call upon 
developed nations to provide "new and additional financial resources" 
to developing countries to aid them in meeting their obligations under 
the Convention and in benefiting from its provisions.176 
B. Sustainable Development: Guiding the Principles with the 
Policy 
The Biodiversity Convention embraces the policy of sustainable 
development.177 The concept of "sustainable use," ubiquitous both ex-
plicitly and implicitly throughout the document, is defined as the "use 
of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does 
not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby main-
taining its potential to meet the needs . . . of present and future 
note 33, at 828. "Genetic resources" is defined as "genetic material-material of plant, animal, 
microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity-of actual or potential value." 
Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 824. 
171 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 828. Paragraph three limits the definition of 
"genetic resources" for the purposes of Articles Fifteen, Sixteen, and Nineteen. See id. 
172 [d.; see also GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION, supra note 167, at 82. 
173 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 830; see also GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION, supra 
note 167, at 96. 
174 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 830-32 (Articles 'l\venty and 'l\venty-one), 
837-38 (Article Thirty-nine). 
175 GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION, supra note 167, at 100; see also Biodiversity Convention, 
supra note 33, at 830. 
176 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 830; see also GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION, supra 
note 178, at 100. 
177 See, e.g., W. Robert Ward, Man Or Beast: The Convention On Biological Diversity and the 
Emerging Law of Sustainable Development, 28 VAND. J. 'l'RANSNATL L. 823, 829--30 (1995). 
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generations."178 Article Six requires countries to develop "national 
strategies, plans or programmes," or adapt existing ones, for the 
"conservation and sustainable use" of biodiversity resources.179 More-
over, Article Six requires integrating the goals of conservation and 
sustainable use into seemingly unrelated governmental ministries, 
such as transport or health ministries.180 
The Convention recognizes implicitly that a source country cannot 
conserve biodiversity, let alone use it sustainably, if the country does 
not know what particular resources it has.1S1 Identifying and monitor-
ing the "components" of biodiversity, namely, individual species of 
flora and fauna, is the subject of Article Seven.l82 Article Eight calls 
upon countries to manage their biodiversity resources and the areas 
surrounding those resources, especially by establishing "a system of 
protected areas."l83 In doing so, it "recognizes in-situ conservation as 
the primary approach for biodiversity conservation," and suggests 
national legislation as the method to implement in-situ conservation 
management strategies.l84 "Article 10 is the focus of the Convention's 
sustainable use requirements,"l85 requiring countries to adopt meas-
ures to minimize the adverse impact on biodiversity resources from 
use of those resources, to protect harmless traditional cultural uses 
of biodiversity resources, and to encourage cooperation between gov-
ernment and private parties in "developing methods for sustainable 
use of [biodiversity] resources."l86 Article Eleven specifically calls for 
countries to adopt measures that would "act as incentives for the 
conservation and sustainable use of components of [biodiversity]."187 
Individual countries and private parties may contract with one 
another, as Article Ten contemplates, to develop biodiversity re-
sources in a sustainable manner.1SS To the extent a dispute arises be-
tween contracting parties, Article 'l\venty-seven expresses UNCED's 
178 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 824 (Article 'I\vo). 
179 Id. at 825; see also GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION, supra note 167, at 29. 
180 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 825 (Article Six); see also GUIDE TO THE 
CONVENTION, supra note 167, at 32. 
181 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 37, at 825 (calling for identification and monitoring 
activities per Article Seven and Annex I). 
182 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 825 (Article Seven), 838 (Annex I); see also 
GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION, supra note 167, at 33. 
183 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 825 (Article Eight). 
184 GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION, supra note 167, at 39; see also Biodiversity Convention, supra 
note 33, at 825-26. 
185 GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION, supra note 167, at 57. 
186 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 826-27 (Article Ten). 
187 Id. at 827 (Article Eleven). 
188 See id. at 826-27 (Article Ten). 
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desire that it be resolved by alternative dispute resolution methods.189 
Negotiation is the preferred method of dispute resolution.l90 If nego-
tiation is unsuccessful, the next preferred method is mediation.191 If 
mediation fails to result in resolution, the parties then must submit 
their dispute to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice, 
depending upon which one of those two methods the country in which 
the dispute occurs chose at the time of ratification of the Conven-
tion. l92 
Even though the language used in the articles of the Convention-
specifically, the word "shall" -is in the form of requiring countries to 
fulfill certain objectives/93 the Biodiversity Convention, like most in-
ternational instruments, allows for great flexibility. Many of the arti-
cles, although purporting to impose a duty upon individual countries, 
soften any imposition of duty with the phrase "as far as possible and 
as appropriate."I94 Whether bioprospecting "contributes to sustain-
able development[, therefore,] will ultimately depend on the effective-
ness of local and national government policies for conservation and 
development."I96 
VI. COSTA RICA: A CASE STUDY IN THE SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT OF BIODIVERSITY 
One nation's government that has instituted polices to ensure that 
bioprospecting contributes to sustainable development is Costa Rica. 
A. Conservation in the Crucible 
Costa Rica is home to approximately five percent of the world's 
species, even though it has only 0.035 percent of the world's land area, 
an area about the size of the state of West Virginia.l96 Costa Rica's 
climate and topography, ranging from habitats with almost desert-like 
189 [d. at 834. 
190 See id. 
191 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 834. 
192 See id. 
193 For example, Article Seven provides that a country "shall" perform some sort of biodiver-
sity inventory, but only "as far as possible and as appropriate." Biodiversity Convention, supra 
note 33, at 825. Another example of this type of language is Article Six, requiring countries to 
develop plans for "conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity," but, again, only "in accord-
ance with its particular conditions and capabilities." [d. 
194 See id. While such loophole language casts doubt upon actual enforcement of Convention 
provisions, it is an issue deserving in-depth discussion beyond the scope of this Comment. 
196 Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 9. 
196 See David Tenenbaum, The Greening o/Costa Rica, TECH. REV., Oct. 1, 1995, at 42. 
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conditions to tropical rainforests, and fluctuating in elevation from sea 
level to over 3500m, are the characteristics and conditions that cre-
ated this bountiful biodiversity.197 
Costa Rica's biodiversity also has benefited from another set of 
characteristics and conditions-a stable political, economic, and social 
order.198 In 1948, the Costa Rican government abolished the national 
army, and used the resulting "peace dividend" for domestic programs 
such as "education, rural electrification, and health."199 The success of 
this progressive policy approach adopted by successive Costa Rican 
governing administrations is reflected today in the relative health of 
the country.200 Even though the per capita income, for example, is 
significantly less than that of industrialized developed nations, Costa 
Rica enjoys ''widespread relative prosperity" producing a sense of 
security and self-confidence comparable to that of developed na-
tions.201 
Due in part to this relative prosperity, biodiversity conservation 
efforts spanning six governing administrations have been supported 
with enthusiasm by both major political parties and by private citi-
zens.202 Costa Rica's political, social, and economic climate has made it 
somewhat less susceptible to the temptation faced by other develop-
ing nations to allow the exploitation of their biodiversity resources for 
short-term profit.203 Costa Rica, while less susceptible to temptation, 
has not been impervious to it, however.204 
Costa Rica, as one author has noted, is "no modern-day Garden of 
Eden.'I205 As recently as the mid-1980s, the country's tropical forests 
were being razed faster than in most other parts of the world.206 In 
fact, the deforestation rate had reached a high of 100,000 acres per 
197 See Rodrigo Gamez et aI., Costa Rica 8 Conservation Program and National Biodiversity 
Institute (INBio), in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING 53 (1993). Dr. Gamez is the Director of the 
National Biodiversity Institute (INBio) of Costa Rica. See id. at 325. 
198 See id. at 54. 
199 Tenenbaum, supra note 196. 
200 See id. Costa Rica boasts a ninety-three percent literacy rate, a per capita income of 
US$2,OOO per year, "an infant mortality rate of21 per 1,000 (the other Central American nations 
report between 30 and 89 per 1,000), and a life expectancy for citizens born [in 1995] of 77.5 
years, a figure that exceeds the world average by ten years." Id. 
201 Gamez, supra note 197, at 54. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. 
204 See Tenenbaum, supra note 196. 
206Id. 
206 See id.; see also Michael Milstein, The Microbe Hunt: Costa Rica Stakes Future On Rich 
Value of Nature, SAN DIEGO UNION-1'RIB., Mar. 27,1996, at E1 (noting how Costa Rica used to 
yield to temptation, razing its forests for short-term profit). 
; 
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year.207 Costa Rica also has not been immune to the excesses of the 
agricultural industry.208 Range fires set to clear pastures for cattle 
grazing, pesticides used on banana plantations, and overfishing off the 
coast of Cocos National Park all have caused environmental prob-
lems.209 One estimate of the financial loss to Costa Rica from failure 
to nurture its natural biodiversity resources is US$4.1 billion from 
1970 to 1989.210 Costa Rica now, however, is staking its "environment 
and its economy on the long-term value of nature."211 
The current government, headed by president Jose Maria Figueres, 
has adopted a "use it or lose it" theme for its biodiversity conservation 
initiatives.212 This is a less formal moniker for the policy of sustainable 
development, a policy which now permeates the governance of Costa 
Rica.213 On Figueres' first day as president, he organized a symposium 
for all cabinet ministers whose activities in any way dealt with natural 
resources; declared his commitment to sustainable development; and 
asked what each ministry would do in furtherance of that policy.214 
With regard specifically to biodiversity conservation and use, 
Figueres has instituted several different taxes, the revenues from 
which go toward conservation and restoration of biodiversity-rich 
areas, and has exercised authority to halt environmentally harmful 
business development.216 
Innovative ecosystem, habitat, and species management has been 
one of the most significant, and, by all accounts, successful biodiver-
sity-related initiatives of the Costa Rican government.216 Costa Rica 
is in the process of consolidating its national parks into a number of 
vast conservation areas designed to protect the larger ecosystems 
necessary for long-term species survival.217 This process began two 
2(11 See Tenenbaum, supra note 196. The rate today is down to 20,000 acres per year. See id. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. 
210 [d. (quoting economist Robert Repetto of the World Resources Institute). 
211 Milstein, supra note 206. 
212 Leslie Roberts, Chemical Prospecting: Hope for VaniBhing Ecosystems?, SCI., May 22, 
1992, at 1142. 
213 See id .. Daniel Janzen, an internationally renowned biologist from the University of Penn-
sylvania, who has lived half of each of the past thirty years in Costa Rica, has characterized the 
government's level of commitment as follows: "'[Costa Rica has] become a guinea pig: If [it] 
fail[s], everybody will see every aspect of [the failure] as [Costa Rica] goes down in flames. If 
[Costa Rica] succeed[s], [its biodiversity is] all there for the world's people to use ... .''' [d. 
214 [d. (quoting Janzen). 
216 See id. Examples include using revenue from a carbon tax to restore tropical forests on 
idle cow pastures, and "canceling a planned oil-fired electric generating facility in favor of a new 
geothermal plant." Roberts, supra note 212. 
216 See Tenenbaum, supra note 196. 
217 See id. 
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decades ago, and has resulted in approximately twenty-five percent 
of Costa Rica's land being set aside in this manner.218 The consolidation 
into conservation areas is a more recent policy initiative, however, and 
boasts the 423-square-mile Guanacaste Conservation Area as a pilot 
project.219 Guanacaste, about half the size of the state of Rhode Island, 
is home to approximately 330,000 species,220 and is in the process of 
being enlarged through restoration of land that had been used for 
agriculture.221 In addition, by creative cattle grazing and fire-preven-
tion methods,222 a closed-canopy forest is expected to return to a 
700-square-kilometer area within fifty years.223 
These conservation initiatives by Figueres' government, however, 
are motivated by more than biodiversity conservation for its own 
sake-Figueres believes in the second half of sustainable develop-
ment as strongly as he believes in the first half.224 Guanacaste and the 
other conservation areas "are supposed to earn a non-destructive 
profit from ecotourism and pharmaceutical harvesting.''225 The under-
lying premise is that Costa Ricans will want to conserve biodiversity-
rich areas, because conservation will result in the most profitable use 
of the land.226 Managing these conservation areas and facilitating the 
sustainable development of biodiversity resources, however, required 
centralized institutional support. 
B. Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad: The Institutional Steward 
Costa Rica laid the institutional foundation for carrying out its 
conservation and sustainable development policies in two primary 
ways.227 First, in 1986, during the administration of President Oscar 
Arias, Costa Rica created the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy, 
218 See Daniel H. Janzen, A South-North Perspective on Science in the Managment, Use, and 
Economic Development of Biodiversity, in CONSERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY FOR SUSTAIN-
ABLE DEVELOPMENT 32 (O.T. Sandlund et al. eds., 1992). This ranks Costa Rica second only to 
Ecuador "among countries with the highest proportion of nationally owned nature reserves." 
Tenenbaum, supra note 196. 
219 See Tenenbaum, supra note 196. 
220 See id. 
221 See GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY STRATEGY, supra note 112, at 112. 
222 See id. at 112. Since cattle eat grass and not tree seedlings, they continue to graze in the 
area, actually aiding the reforestation by reducing the tree seedlings' competition for nutrients, 
and allowing them to grow faster. See id. In addition, cattle "spread organic matter and disperse 
seeds." ld. 
223 See id. 
224 See Tenenbaum, supra note 196. 
225ld. 
226 See id. 
227 See Gamez, supra note 197, at 54. 
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and Mines (MIRENEM), elevating the environment to cabinet-level 
concern and consolidating the national parks, forestry, and wildlife 
services under one ministry.228 MIRENEM's initial innovations in-
cluded setting up the new National System of Conserved Areas to 
manage the protected wildlands, developing the government's N a-
tional Conservation Strategy for Sustainable Development, and de-
vising creative ways to finance biodiversity conservation through, for 
example, debt-for-nature swaps.229 
In October, 1987, MIRENEM also established its own Biodiversity 
Office (which was to be the forerunner of Costa Rica's national biodi-
versity institute) with financial assistance from the MacArthur Foun-
dation.230 MIRENEM created the Biodiversity Office to develop '''a 
new strategy and conservation program for Costa Rica's wildlands,'" 
a process that engaged various individuals and institutions involved 
with conservation throughout Costa Rica.231 In addition, the Biodiver-
sity Office developed a new "conceptual framework for conservation" 
consisting of three tasks: 
(1) Establishing large conserved wildlands, the Conservation 
Areas; 
(2) Detennining what biodiversity lies in these protected areas 
and where it is located; and 
(3) Integrating the non-destructive use of this biodiversity into 
the intellectual and economic fabric of national and international 
society.232 
The National System of Conservation Areas accomplished the first 
task, but the latter two tasks called for a more unified biodiversity 
program than existed at that time.233 Several regional and national 
meetings and conferences later, Costa Rica consolidated under one 
organization the fragmented biodiversity programs then in both pub-
lic and private hands.234 At a February, 1989 meeting convened by the 
Biodiversity Office, participants reached consensus that a national 
biodiversity institute should be formed to do the following: 
228 See id. These latter three formerly had been under the auspices of the Ministry of Agri-
culture. See id. 
229 See id. at 55. 
280 See id. 
231 Gamez, supra note 197, at 55. 
232 [d. at 55-56. 
233 See id. at 56. 
234 See id. 
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• Develop a national-level strategy and carry out an inventory 
of Costa Rica's biodiversity; 
• Begin integrating all national collections into one physical and 
administrative entity; 
• Centralize all information on Costa Rica's biodiversity; and 
• Put this information into an easily accessible format and dis-
tribute it to the public.235 
A presidential decree established a planning commission directed by 
the Biodiversity Office for the purpose of developing a national biodi-
versity institute.236 The planning commission's work resulted in the 
creation of a "private, non-profit, public-interest association [called] 
'La Asociacion Instituto N acional de Biodiversidad,' or INBio." On 
October 24, 1989, INBio was "legally established and formally incor-
porated.'1237 
1. Administration and Operation of INBio 
A fifteen-member Assembly and a six-member Board of directors 
governs INBio, while a full-time administrative and scientific-techni-
cal staff and a team of dozens of "parataxonomists''238 conduct the daily 
operations of the institute and its affiliated offices.239 As a private, 
non-profit institution, INBio is tax-exempt, receives grants and tax-
free donations of specimens and other materials, and manages its own 
finances240 as well as hires its own personnel.241 
INBio's general objective is "to promote the wise management and 
use of [Costa Rica's] biotic wealth through the development and dis-
tribution of information on species, genes, and ecosystems."242 One of 
INBio's most important projects toward fulfilling this objective is to 
236 Id. at 57. 
236 See Gamez, supra note 197, at 57. 
237 Id. 
238 See generally Daniel H. Janzen et aI., The Role of the Parataxonomists, Inventory Man-
agers, and Thxonomists in Costa Rica's National Biodiversity Inventory, in BIODIVERSITY 
PROSPECTING 223 (1993). 
239 See Gamez, supra note 197, at 57, 59. 
240 In order to launch INBio, three stages of fundraising were conducted. See id. at 58. First, 
from April 1989 through late 1990, US$500,OOO was raised for capital costs such as land, 
buildings, training, and operations. See id. at 59. The second stage, from 1991-1992, netted 
US$2.5 million from a variety of national and international sources, both public and private, 
which INBio used for planning, infrastructure, and development. See id. at 59--60. The final stage 
is an on-going one, seeking long-term financing to sustain INBio and its major projects. See id. 
at 60. 
241 See Gamez, supra note 197, at 58. 
242 GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY STRATEGY, supra note 112, at 152. 
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conduct a National Biodiversity Inventory (NBI).248 The NBI is a 
ten-year project to develop a "taxonomically ... organized database 
of the species that occur in the country, and to identify one or more 
localities where each occurs."244 Some species of "conspicuous use to 
society" receive special emphasis in the inventory. Beyond this first 
level of identification and understanding, INBio hopes to "understand 
species' distribution, natural history, ecology, morphology, behavior, 
phenology, genetic variation, etc."245 The NBI begins from a pre-ex-
isting base of knowledge and collection of specimens accumulated over 
the past century by a "wide variety of national and international 
conservationists and biologists."246 An initial objective of the NBI is to 
gather the pre-existing information and integrate it with the organ-
ized national inventory.247 Costa Rica contains approximately "13,000 
species of plants, 10,000 fungi, 1,500 vertebrates, 290,000 species of 
insects, 75,000 species of aquatic organisms ... 15,000 marine inver-
tebrates, up to 50,000 spiders, mites, and other terrestrial inverte-
brates, as many as 10,000 nematodes," and as many as 50,000 varieties 
of bacteria and viruses.248 Only about twenty percent of these approxi-
mately 500,000 species have been named and described.249 
2. The Mission of INBio 
A primary premise to the mission of INBio is that biodiversity will 
be conserved only if the areas to be protected generate enough intel-
lectual and economic income to sustain conservation efforts and to 
offset revenue foregone from other potential uses.250 One way to gen-
erate this kind of intellectual and economic income is through bio-
243 See Gamez, supra note 197, at 60--£1. Formally, 
INBio's immediate objectives are to: Undertake a total inventory of the biodiversity 
of Costa Rica between 1993 and 2003; Place that information in a computerized and 
physical format that Costa Ricans and others will find easy to use; Insure the preser-
vation into perpetuity of the National Biodiversity Inventory Collections resulting 
from this activity; Facilitate access by national and international users to information 
related to Costa Rica's wildland biodiversity; and greatly increase local 'biological 
literacy' by providing information and fostering use. 
Id. 
244Id. at 62. 
245Id. 
246 Id. at 61. 
247 See Gamez, supra note 197, at 61. 
248Id. at 61~2. 
249 See id. at 62. 
250 See Ana Sittenfeld & Rodrigo Gamez, Biodiversity Prospecting By INBio, in BIODIVER-
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prospecting. An "express goal" of INBio is to use bioprospecting to 
"generat[e] income from Costa Rica's conservation areas so as to 
contribute to Costa Rica's wildland management costs," as well as to 
the country's GNP.251 
Profiting from biodiversity resources in this way is conditioned on 
the Costa Rican government's assertion of property rights over the 
resources.252 Intellectual property rights for "improved genetic and 
biochemical resources" have existed for decades.253 Ownership inter-
ests in unimproved genetic resources, however, traditionally have 
been understood in the context of the "common heritage doctrine."254 
The essence of the common heritage doctrine is that wild species are 
considered "ownerless, open-access resource[s]."255 Bioprospecting in-
volves "wild resources with commercial potential," placing the col-
lected specimens somewhere in between an intellectual property 
rights system and a property rights system based on the common 
heritage doctrine.256 To accommodate the type of resource valuable to 
bioprospecting, the Biodiversity Convention affirms a country's na-
tional sovereignty over its biodiversity resources.257 The Convention 
also asserts, however, that source countries are obliged to facilitate 
access to their biodiversity resources, while all countries-owners of 
biodiversity resources as well as beneficiaries-are obliged to share 
the economic benefits from biodiversity.258 It is on this basis that 
INBio, vested with authority over Costa Rica's biodiversity-rich Con-
servation Areas, has been able to halt what had been a one-way 
bioprospecting process, and transform the process into a two-way 
SITY PROSPECTING 69 (1993). Dr. Sittenfeld is the Director of the Division of Biodiversity 
Prospecting at INBio. See id. at 326. 
2011d. at 69. 
252 See Ian Walden, Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE CONSERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 171, 181 (Michael Bowman & Catherine 
Redgwell eds., 1995). Property rights with respect to biodiversity is a subject deserving a more 
comprehensive discussion than can be provided here, but must be recognized as a significant 
issue. 
263 Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 19. 
264 Id. at 19, 23. 
255 Id. at 19. 
256 I d. at 19. 
207 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 824; see also Reid, New Lease, supra note 
11, at 24. 
258 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 828; see also Reid, New Lease, supra note 
11, at 24. 
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commercial exchange, allowing Costa Rica as the source country to 
profit from its natural biodiversity resources.259 
In addition to profiting from facilitating the commercial transfer of 
biodiversity resources in a non-destructive manner, INBio also is able 
to profit from the value it can add to a party's bioprospecting efforts.260 
The NBI and the trained INBio staff transform haphazard bio-
prospecting into an efficient, organized, and focused endeavor.261 This 
type of arrangement has been captured in contractual relationships 
between INBio and parties such as pharmaceutical and biotechnologi-
cal companies interested in utilizing Costa Rica's biodiversity re-
sources.262 Significantly, INBio is "fully empowered [by the Costa 
Rican government] to enter into contracts and agreements with na-
tional and international institutions and individuals.'1263 
VII. BIOPROSPECTING CONTRACTS 
In September, 1991, INBio and U.S.-based pharmaceutical company 
Merck, Sharp and Dohme, Inc. (Merck) entered into a landmark two-
year contractual relationship anchored on sustainably developing 
Costa Rica's rich biodiversity resources through bioprospecting.264 
Under the terms of the deal, which the parties renewed in 1993266 and 
again in 1996,266 INBio provides Merck with "chemical extracts from 
wild plants, insects, and micro-organisms" primarily, but not exclu-
sively, from Costa Rica's conservation areas.267 Using these chemical 
extracts, Merck hopes to develop-or find clues that will lead to 
developing-a new medicine.268 In exchange, Merck paid INBio an 
up-front fee of US$1 million, donated US$135,OOO worth of equipment 
for use in chemical extraction, and sent two natural products chem-
ists to set up the facilities necessary for chemical extraction and to 
259 See Sittenfeld & Gamez, supra note 250, at 70--71. 
260 See id. 
261 See id. at 76-78. 
262 See, e.g., Laird, supra note 9, at 99. 
263 Gamez, supra note 197, at 58. 
264 See, e.g., Jim Detjen, CO'mpany's Accord On Rain Forests Could Be Model for Preserva-
tion, PHILA. INQUffiER, Sept. 20, 1991, at A01; Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 1. 
266 See id. 
266 Gene Prospecting for the Sustainable Use of the Biodiversity in Costa Rica, GENETIC 
ENGINEERING NEWS, Apr. 1, 1996 (page unavail.) [hereinafter Gene Prospecting]. 
267 Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 1; see also Julia Preston, A Biodiversity Pact with a 
Premium, WASHINGTON POST, June 9, 1992, at A16; Detjen, supra note 264. 
268 See id. 
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train INBio scientists in the extraction process.269 In addition, INBio 
will receive a royalty from any commercially marketable drug devel-
oped from a compound it provides.270 Although the percentage of the 
royalty is confidential, it is widely believed to be between one and 
three percent of net sales.271 Because drug development usually takes 
as long as ten to fifteen ye~rs, and costs between US$300 and 400 
million, the possibility of a royalty obviously is considered a long-
term, prospective benefit of the contract.272 Merck has succeeded in 
the past with natural product drug development, however; the mul-
timillion-dollar cholesterol-lowering drug Mevacor, for example, is 
derived from a microbial extract from soil.273 
INBio and Costa Rica benefit in several- other ways from this con-
tract. One is that the relationship with Merck is non-exclusive in that 
INBio is permitted to enter into agreements with other pharmaceu-
tical companies, or other parties interested in gaining access to Costa 
Rica's biodiversity.274 A second is that ten percent of the up-front fee 
and fifty percent of any royalties go to the Costa Rican government's 
National Park Fund to support conservation efforts.275 This aspect of 
the relationship is significant, because it implies that conservation of 
the biodiversity resources is valuable in the market.276 Contracts that 
create a demand for species samples also create collection-related jobs 
for Costa Ricans, a third, indirect benefit.277 Although less tangible 
than the above benefits, this deal also has generated positive public 
relations for Merck; in 1993, the National Wildlife Federation be-
stowed its Environmental Achievement Award upon Merck for its 
work toward sustainable development as represented by its relation-
ship with INBio.278 
269 See Roberts, supra note 212; see also Michael D. Coughlin, Jr., Note, Using the Merck-IN-
Bio Agreement 7b Clarify the Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 337, 356 (1993). 
270 See Roberts, supra note 212. 
271 See id. 
272 See Maricel Sequeira, Environment: Biodiversity-Rich Costa Rica Takes Stock, Inter 
Press Serv., May 12, 1996 (page unavail.). 
273 See Roberts, supra note 212. 
274 See id. (noting Merck's right of first refusal regarding samples, and INBio's relationships 
with other parties). 
276 See Pharmaceutical Companies Go 'Chemical Prospecting'for New Medicines, supra note 
28; see also Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 1. 
276 See Sam Themstrom, Bio-diversity, MONTREAL GAZE'ITE, Apr. 10, 1993, at B6. 
277 See Roberts, supra note 212. 
278 See Merck Biodiversity Effort Wins NWF Award, ENV'T WK., Feb. 4, 1993 (page unavail.). 
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Capitalizing on the positive exposure from its relationship with 
Merck, INBio since has entered into contractual relationships with 
other companies. In 1996, for example, INBio entered into an agree-
ment with Recombinant BioCatalysis, Inc. (RBI), of Sharon Hill, 
Pennsylvania, to develop "genetic libraries from microbes acquired 
through environmental samples.''279 RBI plans to screen the "genetic 
library" for enzymes that may have industrial uses, while INBio will 
learn recombinant DNA research from RBI scientists.280 
Because of the demand for samples as well as the enormous scope 
of the National Biodiversity Inventory, INBio entered into a different 
sort of contractual arrangement with Intergraph Corporation of 
Huntsville, Alabama.281 Under the agreement, Intergraph and INBio 
are developing a computerized Biodiversity Information Management 
System (BIMS) for INBio to allow it to process the geographic and 
taxonomic information on all the species it gathers over the course of 
the inventory.282 Intergraph is contributing U.S.$750,OOO worth of 
''hardware, software, training and systems integration services," and 
INBio is contributing "what [Intergraph and INBio] describe as its 
'experience and vision in conserving biodiversity through information 
management."'283 The in-kind compensation by Intergraph includes 
"customization and installation of the [software] system, the training 
of two INBio staff members, and software upgrades and hardware 
maintenance over 18 months."284 This arrangement ultimately will 
provide INBio with technological sophistication in the form of a com-
puterized database286 which will enhance its ability to attract more 
requests for species samples due to the professional service it can 
provide, moving INBio closer to self-sufficiency. Thus, the interna-
tional attention INBio attracted through its contract with Merck 
already has facilitated INBio's goals of conservation and sustainable 
use; INBio has been able to garner more bioprospecting contracts as 
well as to offer value-added bioprospecting through high technol-
ogy.286 
279 Gene Prospecting, supra note 266. 
280 [d. 
281 See Biodiversity System Set/or Costa Rica, NEW TECH. WK., May 3,1993 (page unavaii.); 
see also Gamez, supra note 197, at 63-65. 
282 See Gamez, supra note 197, at 64. 
288 Biodiversity System Set/or Costa Rica, supra note 281. 
284 Gamez, supra note 197, at 64. 
286 See id. 
286 See id. at 63. 
162 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:129 
As the Merck-INBio deal illustrates, a private contract is one way 
to establish a legal framework within which bioprospecting can be 
conducted.287 The parties to a typical bioprospecting contract are the 
source-country collector of biological samples and a pharmaceutical or 
biotechnology company desiring supplies of such samples for re-
search.288 Source-country collectors such as INBio "collect, taxonomi-
cally identify, and ship to soliciting companies a supply of samples for 
screening.''289 In return, companies generally pay a fee to collectors, 
as well as promise a royalty on proceeds from any drug that the 
company may develop from one or more of the samples provided by 
the collector.290 An alternative arrangement is where the collector 
serves as an intermediary between the pharmaceutical company and 
a third party which does the actual collection work, known as an 
in-country collaborator.291 An in-country collaborator may be a botani-
calor scientific institution, or, less likely, the collaborator may be a 
private individual or business.292 While the collector will have a formal 
legal relationship with a company, the collector likely will have only 
an informal relationship with an in-country collaborator.293 The par-
ticular terms of bioprospecting contracts will depend, of course, on 
the facts and circumstances of the proposed relationship.294 There are, 
however, other general provisions that parties should consider. 
A. Primary Issues to Resolve by Contract: Access, Supply, and 
Enforcement 
One issue parties should consider providing for contractually is ac-
cess to biodiversity resources, particularly with respect to any source 
country regulation of access.2~ A company may be able to contract 
for the actual biological samples, or only for extracts of those sam-
ples.296 This likely will depend on how the source country government 
exercises its sovereignty over the biodiversity resources within its 
boundaries in light of the Biodiversity Convention.297 
287 See, e.g., Laird, supra note 9, at 99. 
288 See id. 
289 [d. at 100. 
290 See id. 
291 See id. at 107. 
292 See Laird, supra note 9, at 107. 
293 See id. 
294 See Rubin & Fish, supra note 16, at 37. 
295 See id. at 37-38. 
296 See id. at 37. 
297 See id. at 38. 
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A second major issue that should be subjected to contract is sample 
supply,298 Pharmaceutical companies are interested in both quality and 
availability of the samples,299 Quality samples that come from a stable 
supply are found more often in institutions whose collectors are 
skilled scientifically and taxonomically,300 The desire on the part of the 
companies for trained collectors and for an infrastructure to ensure 
the future delivery of the same or similar samples has resulted in 
species collection being conducted by non-profit institutions,30l In ad-
dition to selection of the collector, actual collection of the samples is 
also important,802 Three primary methods of collection are comprehen-
sive,803 ethnobotanical,304 and combined,306 A contract likely will specify 
what methods may be used,3°O 
Compensation for sample supply can take many forms, both mone-
tary and non-monetary,307 Monetary compensation includes providing 
for advance payments and royalties provisions, mentioned above,30B 
Non-monetary compensation may be in the form of technology trans-
fer to the source country or to a representative institution,309 but more 
creative possibilities exist,310 Consider the following: 
[p]rovision of health care and medicine, education and related 
material, training in collection and specimen-identification tech-
niques, screening and other aspects of drug discovery, sharing of 
lab results, opportunities to be co-authors of publications, herbar-
ium specimens for national and local herbaria, contributions to 
institutional infrastructure, development of field guides and data-
bases, field equipment, botanical literature, academic exchanges, 
research exchanges with contracting companies, research on 
source country diseases, and the distribution of drugs at cost in 
countries of collection,8ll 
298 See id. at 37. 
299 See Laird, supra note 9, at 106. 
300 See id. 
301 See id. at 105--06. That is not to say that the institutions do not rely on individuals; they 
do. See Rubin & Fish, supra note 16, at 38. 
3W See Rubin & Fish, supra note 16, at 38. 
803 As the name suggests, this method provides access to, for example, all flowering plants. 
See id. at 39. 
S04 This method is "directed by the knowledge of indigenous and local peoples." [d. 
306 This method is a combination of the first two, in that the ethnobotanical knowledge defines 
the degree of comprehensiveness. See id. at 40. 
806 See id. at 38. 
80'1 See Laird, supra note 9, at 108-16. 
806 See id. at lOS. 
309 See id. at 114; see also Calestous Juma with Bernard Sihanya, Policy Options for Scientijic 
and Technological Capacity-Building, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING, 199, 199-219 (1993). 
310 See Laird, supra note 9, at 114. 
3ll [d.; see also Rubin & Fish, supra note 16, at 53. 
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Bioprospecting agreements also should "create incentives for sus-
tainable use and conservation of biodiversity .... "S12 This raises a 
related issue that should be decided by contract: how conservation of 
biodiversity will be achieved, both for the ecological value of conser-
vation, and for the utilitarian value of sample species availability in 
the future.sls "Most existing contractual agreements between compa-
nies and collectors, however, include few explicit provisions for the 
conservation of biodiversity."s14 Instead, conservation is encouraged 
indirectly through the promise of possible future financial gain from 
species re-collection and from solicitations for new sets of samples.S16 
Some commentators have suggested more direct conservation incen-
tives be included in the contract.S16 Others have suggested that 
the anticipated revenue from existing and future bioprospecting con-
tracts provides sufficient incentive to conserve biodiversity.3l7 A final 
issue contracting parties should address explicitly is the method of 
enforcement of the terms of the agreement.31B The Biodiversity Con-
vention encourages use of alternative dispute resolution methods.3l9 
B. Financing Sustainable Development 
'!\vo innovative contractual methods of financing sustainable devel-
opment by source countries deserve special mention. Material trans-
fer agreements and debt-for-nature swaps can help developing coun-
tries make an initial commitment to conserving their biodiversity 
resources, and also can provide the technology and financial incentive 
to sustain that commitment. 
A material transfer agreement (MTA) is a contract by which 
biotechnology and biological material are shared for mutual benefit.320 
An MTA can be a freestanding contract, or it can be incorporated as 
part of the compensation arrangement in a comprehensive bio-
prospecting contract.32l Either way, this contractual arrangement is 
312 Rubin & Fish, supra note 16, at 32. 
313 See id. at 55; Laird, supra note 9, at 123. 
314 Laird, supra note 9, at 124. 
316 See Rubin & Fish, supra note 16, at 55. 
316 See, e.g., Laird, supra note 9 at 124. 
317 See id. 
318 See Rubin & Fish, supra note 16, at 57. 
319 See id. 
320 See Daniel M. Putterman, Model Material1'ransfer Agreements for Equitable Biodiversity 
Prospecting, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 149, 150-51 (1996). 
321 See, e.g., Laird, supra note 9, at 114. 
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itself one way of implementing Article Sixteen of the Biodiversity 
Convention, calling for facilitating access to and transfer of biotech-
nology322 
A second contractual relationship that facilitates the commingling 
of economic incentives with biodiversity conservation incentives is a 
"debt-for-nature swap."323 The basic structure of a debt-for-nature 
swap is as follows: Public or private actors, usually in developed 
countries, purchase developing country debt on the secondary mar-
ket.324 "The purchaser then trades its right to repayment of the debt 
for a commitment on the part of the developing nation to protect ... 
the environmentally vulnerable lands within its territory."325 The ra-
tionale for these exchanges is to stop developing countries from 
wastefully exploiting their biodiversity resources by recognizing their 
need to replace conservation-related income loss with economic bene-
fits of some type.326 Costa Rica is one country that has benefited from 
this type of exchange.327 By March 1990, World Wildlife Fund - US, 
The Nature Conservancy, The Netherlands, Sweden, and others had 
acquired Costa Rican debt worth a total of $79,253,631.328 Being finan-
cially unburdened in this way was part of what allowed Costa Rica's 
government, as mentioned, to ''bet its entire economy on biodiversity 
conservation."329 While some have criticized these exchanges,330 debt-
for-nature swaps have proven to be beneficial among developing coun-
tries.331 
322 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 829 (Article 16). See Putterman, supra note 
320, at 15(H)9 (proposing model MTAs). 
il23 See, e.g., Catherine A. O'Neill & Cass R. Sunstein, Economics and Environment: Trading 
Debt and Technology for Nature, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 93, 93 (1992); Maurizio Levi Minzi, 
Note, The Pied Piper of Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 37, 37-38 (1993). 
324 See O'Neill & Sunstein, supra note 323, at 107, 109. 
325 [d. at 109. 
326 See id. at 97, 103. 
327 See id. at 108. 
328 See id. 
329 Tenenbaum, supra note 196. Bolivia provides another example. See Minzi, supra note 323, 
at 49. In 1987, Conservation International (CI) purchased approximately US$650,OOO of Bolivian 
debt. See id. CI then canceled the debt in exchange for the Bolivian government's protection of 
the 334,OOO-acre Beni Biosphere Reserve, as well as of a nearby regional park and water basin, 
a 3,870,561-acre forest reserve, and for the establishment of a management and protection fund 
for the biosphere. See id. at 49-50. 
330 See O'Neill & Sun stein, supra note 323, at 112-18 (artiCUlating common criticisms). 
331 [d. at 121. 
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VIII. BUILDING THE CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Conserving raw medicinal materials with which scientists are pres-
ently familiar and with which scientists hope to become familiar must 
be a primary motivation for protecting the world's biodiversity. A 
legal framework which simultaneously encourages conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity (the source of raw medicinal materials) 
must be constructed in order to accomplish that objective. That legal 
framework can be held together only by the mortar of sustainable 
development and its three interconnected components: saving, know-
ing, and using biodiversity.332 Yet, bioprospecting for raw medicinal 
materials occurs today in a "policy vacuum."333 To construct a sturdy 
and finished legal framework in that vacuum, then, we must integrate 
experiences with existing methods of sustainable development. The 
international legal principles articulated in the Biodiversity Conven-
tion should form the foundation.334 Next, individual countries, particu-
larly those rich in biodiversity resources, each should establish its own 
national biodiversity institute modeled in form and function on Costa 
Rica's INBio.335 Finally, both biodiversity-rich countries-relying on 
their national biodiversity institutes-and parties seeking access to 
biodiversity resources should enter into contractual relationships de-
signed to facilitate the conservation and the use components of sus-
tainable development. 336 
A. The Biodiversity Convention: Foundation of Law and Policy 
for Bioprospecting Contracts 
Developed countries and others can bemoan the destruction of 
biodiversity-rich tropical rainforests, but until the countries which are 
sovereign over biodiversity-rich areas receive financial incentives to 
conserve those areas, biodiversity destruction will continue.337 Sus-
tainable development is a policy that accepts this reality by seeking 
to align economic incentives with biodiversity conservation.338 Relying 
on economic incentives to promote biodiversity conservation is an 
332 See Janzen, supra note 218, at 27-28 (discussing these three steps in the process of 
biodiversity conservation). 
333 Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 2. 
334 See supra notes 140--95 and accompanying text. 
335 See supra notes 227-~)3 and accompanying text. 
336 See supra notes 1~9, 264-331 and accompanying text. 
337 See, e.g., Marroquin-Merino, supra note 169, at 316-17. 
338 See McNEELY, ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 47, at 40. 
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explicit rejection of morality as an alternative incentive for conserva-
tion. The morality incentive states that "all forms of life warrant 
respect, regardless of their worth to people," and therefore should be 
conserved as a matter of moral virtue.339 The morality incentive de-
nies, however, the reality of developing nations: Developing nations 
must rely on the wealth they have, which is often natural resource 
wealth, in order to meet the needs of the people and their govern-
ment.340 Morality may be an adequate rationale to act against human 
rights abuses. As applied in this instance, however, morality would 
require an impenetrable fence built around biodiversity-rich areas, 
effectuating a different kind of human rights abuse by depriving 
developing countries of the use of their own natural resources by 
which they sustain themselves. The international community, there-
fore, embraced an economic-incentive-based view on biodiversity con-
servation.341 
The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity adopts in-
ternational legal principles which legitimize this economic approach 
to biodiversity conservation.342 Recall that Article Eleven provides 
that each country "shall . . . adopt economically and socially sound 
measures that act as incentives for the conservation and sustain-
able use of components of biological diversity.'1343 Article Fifteen then 
obliges countries to "shar[e] in a fair and equitable way the results of 
research and development and the benefits arising from the commer-
cial ... utilization" of biodiversity resources.344 Article Eleven's call 
for economic incentives for sustainable development and Article Fif-
teen's requirement for sharing benefits from sustainable development 
together indicate that the Convention contemplates compensation for 
biodiversity resources.346 With Article Fifteen's reaffirmation of na-
tional sovereignty over biodiversity resources, individual countries 
should act affirmatively to avail themselves of the new market in 
biodiversity resources created by the Convention. 
889 See McNeely, Biodiversity Crisis, supra note 51, at 15, 16. 
340 See Marroquin-Merino, supra note 169, at 320, 322. 
34l See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 826-27 (Articles Ten and Eleven). 
342 See Marroquin-Merino, supra note 169 at 324. 
343 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 827. 
1!44 Id. at 828; see also Karen Anne Goldman, Note, Compensation for Use of Biological 
Resources Under the Convention on Biological Diversity: Compatibility of Conservation Meas-
ures and Competitiveness of the Biotechnology Industry, 25 LAW & POL'y INTL Bus. 695, 708 
(1994) (noting that Article Fifteen provides the basis for compensation). 
346 See Goldman, supra note 344, at 708. 
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Even though international agreements such as this one tend toward 
the general and the aspirational, this Convention should not be cast 
aside as just another hortatory international document. It is, instead, 
a useful instrument of "nonbinding international 'soft law,"'346 calling 
upon countries to develop their own biodiversity conservation strate-
gies and enact their own legislation designed to allow them to benefit 
economically from biodiversity.347 One author has called the Conven-
tion a "'menu' of best practices," which governments of individual 
countries may adapt to their unique needs, and may rely upon for 
guidance in formulating national policies and strategies.348 The next 
logical step, then, is for individual countries to build upon the founda-
tion of the Convention by erecting institutional structures to capital-
ize economically on biodiversity resources. 
B. The Individual Importance of a National Biodiversity Institute 
Pedanius Dioscorides of Anazarbus, in Cilicia, a Greek physician 
who lived in the first century A.D., has been called the first medical 
botanist.349 One of Dioscorides' earliest prescriptions was to use juice 
obtained from the white willow as a method of treating gout.350 Eight-
een hundred years later, chemists discerned that a compound called 
salicin was responsible for the "analgesic effects" of willow juice.3s1 
They then were able to modify salicin into salicylic acid, which proved 
to be effective against skin diseases.352 Salicylic acid could not be taken 
internally, however, until 1899, when German chemists modified it 
further into acetylsalicylic acid-more popularly known as aspirin.353 
1\vo lessons can be learned from this brief history of aspirin. First, 
even though bioprospecting for medicinally valuable plants has been 
going on for centuries, understanding fully all the medicinal uses to 
346 Lee A. Kimball, The Biodiversity Convention: HIYW 7b Make It Work, 28 VAND. J. TRAN-
SNATL L. 763, 766 (noting that "many international legal obligations in the environmental field 
are fairly general, with few international means for enforcement"). "Soft law" consists of rules 
"which are not legally binding per se but which . . . point[] to the likely future direction of 
formally binding obligations[,] ... informally establish[] acceptable norms of behaviour, and ... 
reflect[] rules of customary law." SANDS, supra note 35, at 103. "Hard law" establishes "legally 
binding obligations." [d. 
347 See Tinker, supra note 140, at 202-03. 
348 Kimball, supra note 346, at 766. 
349 See JOYCE, supra note 69, at 12-13. 
350 See id. at 13. 
351 [d. at 13-14. 
352 See id. 
353 See id. at 14. 
1997] SUSTAINABLE BIOPROSPECTING 169 
which plants may be put is a continual, rather than a finite, process.354 
Second, that process often includes cycles of discovery, neglect, and 
rediscovery.355 Drawing upon examples of bioprospecting mentioned 
earlier, a third lesson is that flora and fauna may not always survive 
for this process to run its recurring course.356 Countries seeking to 
build on the Biodiversity Convention's foundation should understand 
these lessons to require a full commitment to sustainable development 
of biodiversity resources. 
Establishing a national biodiversity institute modeled in form and 
in function on Costa Rica's INBio should be the first part of that 
commitment.367 A national biodiversity institute should be charac-
terized by its ability to perform three basic functions. First, it should 
be able to save "representative samples" of biodiversity resources as 
well as the ecosystems of which they are part.358 That is, a national 
biodiversity institute should have the capability to collect and to store 
samples of individual species, but it also should have the conservation 
management capability to "save" the habitats and ecosystems in 
which those species live. Second, a national biodiversity institute 
should be able to know what the biodiversity resources are, and 
where they can be found.359 This requires botanical, biological, and 
taxonomic knowledge on the part of employees of the institute, as well 
as basic data management capabilities on the part of the institute 
itself. (This sort of sophisticated knowledge of biodiversity adds value 
to basic sample collection, and allows an institute to command greater 
compensation for its services.) Third, the institute should be able to 
use biodiversity "non-destructively for societal aims."360 A condition 
precedent to this characteristic function is that such an institute 
should be vested with a degree of autonomy in relation to the govern-
ment which establishes it.36! An institute's relative autonomy would 
insulate biodiversity conservation efforts from political whim, and 
would facilitate the commercialization of biodiversity. An autonomous 
institute would be able to enter into bioprospecting contracts with 
354 See JOYCE, supra note 69, at 13. 
366 See id. 
356 Recall, for example, NCI harvesting Kenya's May tenus buchananni into extinction. See 
supra notes 83--84 and accompanying text. 
357 See generally Gamez, supra note 197, at 53; Sittenfeld and Gamez, supra note 250, at 69. 
358 Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 28; see Janzen, supra note 218, at 28, 30-24. 
359 Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 28; see Janzen, supra note 218, at 28, 34-30. 
360 Reid, New Lease, supra note 11, at 28; see Janzen, supra note 218, at 28, 40-51. 
361 See Gamez, supra note 197, at 58; see also supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
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parties seeking access to a country's biodiversity resources without, 
for example, suffering under the perceived management inefficiencies 
of governments. 
C. Drafting the Bioprospecting Contract 
Once a national biodiversity institute is established, and vested 
with legal autonomy, the second part of a full commitment to sustain-
able development of raw medicinal materials should be for the insti-
tute to enter into contractual relationships with parties seeking access 
to those resources. Other methods exist which seek to address the 
issue of access to biodiversity, such as selling use permits,362 or creat-
ing an intellectual property rights scheme.363 To accomplish the objec-
tive of conserving and using raw medicinal materials sustainably, 
however, the method facilitating access should have the following 
three conditions. First, there should be continuity of control over bio-
diversity resources. Second, the source country must have a vested 
economic interest in conservation. Third, parties seeking access must 
be accountable for their bioprospecting-related actions. Contracts, 
moreso than any other method, can help create and reenforce these 
three conditions. 
First, contracts can maintain continuity of control over biodiversity 
resources. The Convention on Biological Diversity recognizes conti-
nuity of control as a goal, by reasserting the prominence of the inter-
national legal principle of national sovereignty over biodiversity re-
sources.364 The Convention also implicitly recognizes that developing 
nations often have been frustrated in their attempts to exercise na-
tional sovereignty over their own resources.366 A contract would fa-
cilitate the exercise of national sovereignty over biodiversity re-
sources, because one contracting party-the national biodiversity 
institute-retains ultimate ownership over resources. Selling the 
ownership rights to a species, or to a habitat, on the other hand, makes 
biodiversity a transferable commodity, subject to further resale. With 
362 See, e.g., Daniel H. Janzen et al., Research Management Policies: Permits for Collecting 
and Research in the Tropics, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING 131, 133 (1993). 
363 See, e.g., Michael A. Gollin, An Intellectual Property Rights Framework for Biodiversity 
Propsecting, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING 159 (1993). 
364 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 33, at 824 (Article Three); see also Bosselmann, 
supra note 35, at 135. 
366 For example, because of the economic realities of developing countries, national sover-
eignty often is sacrificed to timber or agricultural interests in order to generate income. See 
Bragdon, supra note 145, at 389. 
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each change in ownership comes a change in stewardship. Not all 
owners will perceive conservation to be in their best interest. A 
national biodiversity institute which enters into multiple contracts 
must engage in wise stewardship of biodiversity, or risk defaulting 
on, for example, an agreement to provide a continuous supply of a 
certain species. Contracts reward this desirable type of control. 
Second, the source country must have a vested interest in conser-
vation. One of the major premises of the policy of sustainable devel-
opment (and of the Convention, which embraced this policy) is that 
biodiversity resources will not be developed in a sustainable manner 
unless the source country stands to benefit financially from conserva-
tion.366 Selling ownership rights or use permits to biodiversity are 
passive approaches to resource management which remove the sense 
of responsibility that comes with ownership. Those approaches, more-
over, offer only a one-time financial gain which, if a drug ultimately is 
developed, will prove to be inadequate compensation. Compensation 
packages, therefore, can help countries identify conservation as in 
their best interest. Contracts with terms specifying that money be 
used for conservation also can specify that a government receive a 
percentage of the compensation paid to the national biodiversity in-
stitute to enhance the government's other conservation-related ef-
forts.367 Moreover, natural product drug development knows no end 
as long as there are natural products from which drugs may be devel-
oped. This provides source countries with bargaining power, obviating 
the need for a quick financial fix. A contract term providing compen-
sation for continued sample supply is one way contracts can provide 
a financial reward for conservation. 
Third, contracts can force accountability on parties seeking access 
to biodiversity resources. If pharmaceutical companies, for example, 
were allowed to bioprospect with no check on their activity, the com-
panies' prospecting teams might run roughshod over sensitive ecosys-
tems, with little regard for much more than extracting the samples 
they wanted to extract in the quantities they desired. Unrestricted 
bioprospecting would result in continued species depletion or oblit-
eration, habitat wreckage, and ecosystem imbalance. Requiring a 
366 See, e.g., Marroquin-Merino, supra note 169, at 316-17; McNEELY, ECONOMICS AND BIO-
LOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 47, at 40. 
387 See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text. Even though Merck does not pay Costa 
Rica directly, payment to the government-affiliated INBio achieves the desired effect of com-
pensating the country. 
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company to contract with a party-a national biodiversity institute-
whose mission is conservation would help to ensure that biodiversity 
resources would not be subjected to harmfulbioprospecting methods. 
A contractual relationship designed to promote sustainable bio-
prospecting does present potential problems, however. One problem 
would be if a source country is unable to establish a national biodiver-
sity institute with the form and function-and degree of autonomy-
of INBio.368 Not having such an institute could undermine the condi-
tion of continuity of control.369 Second, even if a national biodiversity 
institute exists and does enter into a contract with a pharmaceutical 
company, whether the terms of the contract could be enforced in the 
event of a breach is uncertain.370 Parties at least should incorporate 
into their contract the alternative dispute resolution methods of en-
forcement articulated in Article Twenty-seven of the Biodiversity 
Convention.371 A third problem arises out of the commercialization of 
biodiversity resources. Commodifying species or samples of species 
through contracts may exacerbate the problem of biopiracy.372 Miti-
gating the threat of biopiracy, however, is the very process itself of 
natural product drug development.373 One sample is useful in prelimi-
nary screening, but as raw medicinal material passes through succes-
sive clinical trials, a steady supply of the species sample is required.374 
Biopirates are unlikely to have the capability to sustain the supply 
over several years, let alone the decade that it takes for some natural 
products to be developed into marketable pharmaceuticals. Pharma-
ceutical companies and others simply are unlikely to bear the risk of 
an evaporating species supply. 
A private contract between a national biodiversity institute and a 
party seeking access to biodiversity resources is the best way to 
facilitate the transfer of money and technology to biodiversity-rich 
countries so that raw medicinal materials will be conserved for pre-
sent· and future use. As has been demonstrated, bioprospecting con-
tracts are one of the "most promising form[s]" of investment in bio-
diversity conservation, offering "substantial economic benefits" for all 
368 See supra notes 227~3 and accompanying text. 
369 See supra notes 293-317 and accompanying text. 
370 See Laird, supra note 9, at 101 (noting that contracts of this type can prove "expensive 
and difficult to ... enforce"). 
371 See Rubin & Fish, supra note 16, at 57. 
372 See supra notes 86-103 and accompanying text. 
373 See supra notes 7tHl2 and accompanying text. 
374 See Reid, Biodiversity and Health, supra note 113. 
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parties.376 The agreement between Merck and INBio illustrates the 
mutual economic benefit that can be achieved through contracts.376 It 
also illustrates the market value of conservation management of bio-
diversity resources.377 Of course, not all contracts will turn out as 
positively as the Merck-INBio deal has. The success of each contact 
will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of the situ-
ation. 
Bioprospecting contracts should contain, however, at least the fol-
lowing terms in order to align economic incentives with sustainable 
development practices. First, the party seeking access to biodiversity 
resources should "pay[] a flat fee" to the national biodiversity institute 
"to finance the protection of specific habitats and the collection of 
plant and animal species."378 A flat fee allows an institute to profit 
immediately off of its conservation efforts. Second, the party seeking 
access should arrange financing for the purchase of technological 
equipment by the institute, or should include the transfer of techno-
logical equipment as part of the compensation package.379 This would 
serve two purposes. An institute based in a developing nation would 
receive technological equipment which it otherwise may not have the 
capability to purchase. In-kind compensation of this type also would 
add value to an institute's bioprospecting efforts once the institute 
staff became proficient with the equipment. Third, the party seeking 
access should train or provide funding for the training of local scien-
tists, technicians, taxonomists, and other skilled or semi-skilled work-
ers involved with bioprospecting.380 The second and third terms are, 
in effect, an investment in the institute, on which a pharmaceutical 
company can expect a reasonable return in the form of enhanced 
bioprospecting capabilities. Fourth, the company should agree to pro-
vide a royalty to the national biodiversity institute in the event that 
a drug derived from one of the samples reaches market.ss1 
A national biodiversity institute also should have certain obliga-
tions under a contract. These obligations should reflect the bio-
prospecting-related capabilities of the institute at the time of con-
tract, with an eye toward enhanced capabilities as a result of the 
875 Marroquin-Merino, 8upm note 169, at 336. 
878 See supm notes 264-94, and accompanying text. 
87'1 See id. 
878 Marroquin-Merino, 8upm note 169, at 337. 
879 See id. 
380 See id. 
881 See id. 
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contract.382 From the pharmaceutical company's perspective, the man-
agement, expertise, and stability of an institution make it a more 
attractive party with which to contract.333 The institute should be able 
to do the actual collecting.384 The institute should take steps to main-
tain quality and availability of sample supply.386 Like INBio, it should 
develop sophisticated and comprehensive knowledge of biodiversity 
resources, and manage that knowledge in a way that will provide 
sharper direction to the search for nature's raw medicinal materials.386 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing are just some of the issues that contracting parties 
should consider when addressing access to and development of biodi-
versity resources. Drafting a bioprospecting contract is not simple, 
but the complexity of the endeavor should not dissuade companies 
and countries from doing so. Better than any other method, bio-
prospecting contracts can provide the type of economic-based incen-
tives that encourage all parties to embrace conservation as being in 
their best interest. Identifying and understanding the issues, inter-
ests, and incentives of sustainable bioprospecting should clarify the 
type of conduct (and contract) required of the international commu-
nity, individual countries, and private companies to ensure the contin-
ued viability of our raw medicinal materials. 
382 See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
383 See Laird, supra note 9, at 106 (highlighting characteristics of ideal collector from indus-
try's perspective, and suggesting that those characteristics are present more often in institu-
tional setting). 
384 See id. at 105. 
385 See id. at 102 (noting that companies enter into contracts to obtain "regular and reliable 
supplies of samples"). 
386 See generally Gamez, supra note 197, at 53. 
